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I. Introduction
Since 1991, Vietnam attracted a high volume of foreign investments as a result of policy
reform toward market economy introduced in the late 1980s. However, Vietnam's foreign
investments are mired with problems both for the host country and for investors coming
to Vietnam. To the dismay of the government, foreign investments projects in Vietnam are
characterized by a) a high concentration in a few subsectors such as oil and gas and hotels,
i.e. in low-risk projects instead of diversified investment in manufacturing; b) more signifi-
candy, a low rate of implementation of about thirty percent of investments approved. Low
rate of implementation thus creates a high level of approved investment (investments com-
mitted), which is deceptive. To the many foreign investors who had to deal with many
problems of Vietnam's bureaucracy in trying to get their projects approved and imple-
mented a decade of trying to make profit in the emerging market of Vietnam is a decade
of time lost and of disappointment.
This article suggests that the slow implementation of projects was due in part to problems
within the country's current legal framework, which also caused a sharp decline in the level
of foreign investments commitments for the last two years. Foreign investors had hoped
for significant reform of the legal framework and that related policies would be undertaken,
but the government has been slow to respond to their concerns. Vietnam's unstable legal
framework and regulatory impediments seem to have prevented serious investors, particu-
larly those coming from the West, from implementing high-risk, long-gestation projects.
The legal fatigue has made a few foreign investors give up on Vietnam.
Vietnam's legal system for foreign investments contains a special regime featuring tax
and other incentives for foreign investments. It is a legal enclave. Apart from several specific
problems within this enclave, the larger issue is whether the concept of legal enclave is a
good one for Vietnam. This article argues that the concept of legal enclave can be useful
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in the short-run to attract foreign investments, but in the long run the enclave should be
phased out, as a sound investment climate made of a stable legal framework and a general
deregulation policy is preferable to enclave strategy.
II. Scope
This study will first briefly review Vietnam's Reform Program (Doi-Moi or Renovation)
designed to transform its command economy into a market economy' and assess foreign
investments performance as a result of this changed policy. The following section will
analyze Vietnam's 1989 Foreign Investments Law and recent amendments, including the
latest amendments introduced in November 1996; the analysis will focus on the legal en-
clave nature of Vietnam's foreign investments regime. Next, the article will assess regulatory
issues, particularly Vietnam's process of foreign investments approval, which has been the
most serious and continuing problem for foreign investors in Vietnam. Then it turns to
some substantive law issues pertinent to foreign investments, such as corporate governance
in joint venture projects and land use rights. An evaluation of important issues of Vietnam's
law enforcement including the court system, adjudication method, particularly the resolu-
tion of commercial disputes which form the country's legal infrastructure, is included along
with a review of the country's emerging legal profession and reformed legal education
system.
To help Vietnam policy-makers improve their nascent legal framework, the article adopts
the broad approach to deal with generic issues of Vietnam's legal framework in transition,
that is, issues related to Vietnam's efforts to establish the Rule of Law in contrast to its
Rule by Decree during the war. The article will, however, attempt to address these issues
in a practical way, in some detail, with an eye to making it useful to practicing lawyers,
particularly those who are taking on Vietnam cases or projects for the first time.
m. Vietnam's Reform Program For Transition and
Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam: An Overview
Vietnam started its transition to a market economy in 1989 with a fundamental reform
program known as the Renovation (Doi Moi).2 With the objective of transforming its cen-
trally planned economy into a market system, the program included primarily: (a) a mac-
roeconomic stabilization program including a liberalized foreign exchange; (b) a broad-
based price reform including the elimination of subsidy to state-own enterprises (SOE);
and (c) a new legal framework that permitted for the first time foreign investments and
reactivation of domestic private businesses.
The Foreign Investments Law promulgated in 1987 amended in 1990, 1992 and most
recently in November 1996, was the key element of the reform program. Private domestic
investment was also allowed beyond the micro-enterprise scale, but it was not perceived by
the government as important as direct foreign investments (FDI); the latter was expected
1. Vietnam's reform program has been analyzed in detail by numerous academic institutions and interna-
tional organizations. For a short analysis of this program, see PH.m VAN Tnurx, GEo. MASON U. INDOCHINA
INST., VIETNAMESE ECONOMY: PERFORMANCE AND PROSPECTS, AN OVERVIEW (1992).
2. See id. at opt. cite, n. 1 (citing VIET-NAM: TRANSITION To THE MARKET, AN ECONOMIC REPORT, WORLD
BANK REPORT No. 11902-VN, (1993)).
VOL. 33, NO. 3
VIETNAM'S LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT 767
to jump-start an economy that had been in distress as a result of the abrupt termination of
Soviet Aid following the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The market-oriented reform
brought high growth of output and until 1995, a steadily increasing inflow of foreign direct
investment (Table 1).
The flow of foreign investments started to slow down in 1996 until the final week of
December when the government, in an effort to maintain the increasing trend of FDI
inflow, allegedly approved two large urban development projects worth $3,263 million
amidst loud complaints about problems with investing in Vietnam. These last-minute FDI
approvals represent thirty-eight percent of the year's total. But FDI declined by about fifty
percent in 1997 and continued to fall further in 1998. This decline in foreign investments,
coupled with reduced exports and other negative impacts of the current financial crisis in
Asia have contributed to a reduction of overall economic growth, from a decade's high rate
of nine percent per year to the current four to five percent.'
FDI in Vietnam has been narrowly based, mainly in hotel projects and in capital-intensive
industries, such as oil projects. For example, out of $1,700 million FDI committed during
the first nine months of 1998, $700 million, or forty-one percent, came from one project,
a resort development scheme. Over the years, FDI flow to manufacturing has been limited;
a situation similar to when China began to implement its FDI development program in the
early 1980s.4 As a result, FDI in Vietnam has contributed little to transfer of technology
Table 1
Vietnam: Foreign Investments Approved 1988-1998









1996 326 8,538 (38% approved in the final week of
December, from 5,260 million)
1997 270 4,500
1998 (as of October) 181 1647
Source: Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), formerly State Committee of Cooperation and Invest-
ment (SCCI), published in Vietnam Investment Review, September 15, 1997 (for data throughout December
1997) and October 15,1998 issue for 1998 data (as of October).
3. For an analysis of Viemam's current economic situation, see Pham Van Thuyet, Vietnam: A Tiger or
Wild Cat?, (Nov. 1997) (unpublished paper on file with Columbia University); Pham Van Thuyet, Deepening
Reform for Growth, An Economic Report (Oct. 1997).
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and employment generation, areas in which more manufacturing industries would have
greater effects.
A. PATTERN OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
Most of the largest projects approved are in oil and gas exploration, located in the south-
ern coastal town of Vung-Tau. Tourism industry activities are visible in large cities where
several big, internationally known hotels, among the 250 proposed hotel projects, have been
built. Also popular are consumer electronics assembly for local market and export-oriented
projects using low-cost labor in light industries, such as garments and footwear. While
assembly plants for consumer electronics have been set up mainly by the Japanese and
Koreans, garment and footwear industries have been developed by investors from Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Korea who brought in equipment, fabrics, and other materials
to produce final goods for export.
Over the years, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong alternatively took the lead
in FDI in Vietnam. In October 1998, with a cumulative total investment of $6,447 million
approved, Singapore was the leading country in FDI followed by Taiwan, which in 1996
was the leading country. Singapore and Taiwan, along with Hong Kong, Japan, and South
Korea constitute the five leading countries in foreign investments in Vietnam (Table 2).
U.S. investors started to arrive following the lifting of the U.S. trade embargo against
Vietnam. The arrival of the first U.S. ambassador to Vietnam in May 1997 has raised some
Table 2
Vietnam: Foreign Investments by Countries,
cumulative as of October 1998
Investment Amount
Ranking Country Number of Projects (US$ million)
1 Singapore 181 6.447
2 Taiwan 309 4,268
3 Hongkong 184 3,734
4 Japan 213 3,500
5 South Korea 191 3,154
6 France 89 1,465
7 Malaysia 59 1,370
8 US 70 1,230
9 Thailand 78 1,109
10 British Virgin Island 55 1,089
Source: Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) published in Vietnam Investment Review, October 1998.
4. For an analysis of China's FDI program, see ZAFAR SHAH KHAN, PATTERNS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
IN CHINA, WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS SERIES, No. 130 (1991).
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expectations of more U.S. investment to follow, but U.S. investors are still cautious in view
of the slow implementation of FDI in general and feedback about problems encountered
by early investors.
The United States ranked eighth by October 1998, sixth in 1997, among foreign coun-
tries investing in Vietnam. Countries in the former European Socialist Block have no sig-
nificant investments in Vietnam except the former Soviet Union, which has thirty-five pro-
jects approved of which thirty belong to Russia, totaling $188 million. Japan, while a major
trading partner with Vietnam, had relatively small share in FDI for many years (about $100
million prior to 1993) in part due to Japan's cautious policy in consideration of the U.S.
trade embargo. Japan has increased its share considerably, ranking fourth by October 1998.
About two-thirds of FDI proposed are for projects located in the south, despite Govern-
ment's encouragement and promotion of investment in the northern part of the country.
Foreign investors prefer to have their projects located in the south where, among other
things, the infrastructure is more developed than in the north and business practice as
known in the West is also better understood. Management skills appropriate to market
economy, although in short supply in both the north and south are nevertheless more
available in the latter.
Like China, the majority of Vietnam's foreign investment projects are joint ventures, with
State Owned Enterprises (SOE) or state agencies who almost always contribute their capital
in the form of land-use rights. A 1992 revision of DFI Law allowed private companies to
enter joint ventures with foreign investors. The DFI Law also allows for 100 percent
foreign-owned projects, but relatively few of the approved projects are of this type.
B. HIGH VOLUME OF COMMITMENTS AND SLOW IMPLEMENTATION
Despite a high volume of FDI commitments or approvals, implementation of projects
has been slow, averaging about thirty percent over the years in value terms. Data on im-
plementation are hard to come by as the former State Committee for Cooperation and
Investment (SCCI), now integrated into the Ministry of Planning and Investment, the main
agency in charge of FDI, is still working to improve a system for monitoring project im-
plementation. Yet, aggregate data indicate an annual rate of current year's implementation
to previous year's sanctioning of around thirty percent, assuming projects would start to be
implemented between six months and one year after being sanctioned. (The DFI Law
required that DFI projects be implemented six months following approval). Disaggregated
data compiled on a project basis' also confirmed this low rate of implementation (Table 3).
Project implementation in the oil sector, as in the hotel construction sector, seems to be
the most active as over $400 million have been spent among the twenty-four licenses issued
for exploration in oil or gas. In addition to oil exploration, bidding for oil refineries has
been very active from seventeen bidding companies. In addition to Japan, France and Can-
ada (liquid gas), other countries interested in oil exploration in Vietnam are the newly
industrialized countries (NIC) of Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia.
5. See Kwang W. Jun, Duc Minh Pham, Victoria Kwakwa, Kyle Peters, Jr., & Thang-Long Ton, FOREIGN
CAPITAL FLOW IN VImTNA, WORLD BANK (1997).
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Table 3
Vietnam: Implementation of Foreign Investments Projects, 1991-1998
Year (amount in 1998
US $ milion) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 (est.)
Commitment (Approved) 2,889 2,271 2,987 4,071 6,616 8,500 4,500 2.300
Implementation 620 463 1,002 1,500 2,000 1,800 2,600 1,500
Implementation as percent 21.5 20.4 33.5 36.8 30.2 21.0 58.0 65
of approvals (%)
Source: Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI). Data 1996-1998 from the World Bank, which used
the same source of MPI.
C. VIETNAM PULLOUT: THIS TIME IT IS THE EARLY-BIRD INVEsTORs
Vietnam Pullout, as heralded in the June 24, 1998, Wall Street Journal, was the title of one
of several recent newspaper accounts of declining foreign investments in Vietnam. After
several years of high growth generated in part by a high volume of foreign investments,
Vietnam's growth has slowed down. Foreign investments have declined to about half of the
average over the first five years following the 1989 reform. Several investors, including
some big-name companies such as Chrysler, Hyundai, and the French Oil Company Total,
are pulling out of Vietnam. They represent the first wave of daring investors who jumped
in when Vietnam first opened its market to foreign investors. They have waited for real
reform to bring about a better investment climate to begin implementing their approved
projects. The reform, in the opinion of many observers has produce too little, too late.
Chief among the required changes is reform of the legal framework to provide some security
in transactions for investors, including reform of property law, contract law, company gov-
ernance, and the enforcement of existing laws. The need for such reform of the legal and
regulatory framework has been voiced at various conferences and evidenced by studies done
over the last ten years. It is in this context that this article assesses Vietnam's legal framework
for foreign investments, focusing on its problems and areas for improvement. Improvements
in the legal system and other policy areas are needed if Vietnam intends to lure back foreign
investors, to increase investment and to return to the high rate of growth it has experienced
for a decade. Once the Asian crisis subsides, the prospect of Vietnam reemerging as a high-
growth country is not unrealistic, given the country's comparative advantages of a literate
population, an abundance of labor, and a well-balanced endowment of natural resources.
IV. Vietnam's Enclave-based Strategy on Foreign Investment-
The Emerging Legal Framework for FDI
This section reviews some of the more important aspects of Vietnam's legal framework
for FDI as set out in the Foreign Investments Law. 6 The latest amendments passed by
Parliament, which took effect on March 1, 1997, were considered by the government to be
the new statute on FDI-formally called Law on Foreign investments in Vietnam because
6. The original statute of 1987 was amended in 1990, 1992 and most recently on November 8, 1996.
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they were perceived by the government as extensive enough to replace the old law as a
whole. With a few changes, the new law retains most of the provisions of the old one. The
subsequent sections of this article will also discuss relevant parts of other laws and regula-
tions, particularly regarding land use rights, trade laws, labor laws, and banking regulations,
since the Foreign investments Law does not cover all aspects of the legal framework for
FDI.
A. THE LEGAL ENCLAVE: A SYSTEM OF SPECIAL TAx PRIVILEGES AND OTHER INCENTIVES
FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
Vietnam's current legal framework for FDI constitutes a legal enclave in that a special
regime featuring both privileges and restrictions governs all FDI. The physical enclave in
the form of fenced Export Processing Zones (EPZ) supplements the legal enclave strategy.
The legal enclave for FDI in Vietnam was established by a set of laws and administrative
rules different from the company laws governing the formation and functioning of domestic
companies, and a package of special incentives benefiting FDI that is not available for
domestic investors.
In general, Vietnam's system of special incentives for FDI in substance is comparable to
that of countries of the Association of South East Asia (ASEAN) and South Asia countries
(Table 4), and also comparable to China's incentives package. Regarding tax holidays, Viet-
nam's two-year treatment is more favorable than that of Eastern European countries, which
also have a two-year tax holiday but tax rates are commonly set at forty percent7, higher
than Vietnam's twenty-one to twenty-five percent rates.
B. Tx INCENTIVES
The fiscal incentives package consisting of(a) a tax holiday of up to two years plus another
two years at fifty percent of the tax level; (b) preferential corporate income tax rates between
ten and fifteen percent (less than the normal twenty-one to twenty-five percent rates) for
FDI in the priority categories; and (c) machinery, equipment and raw materials, if used for
export industries, are exempted from import duties.
FDI that meet two of the following criteria are treated as investments in the priority
categories for the purpose of lower tax treatment:
1. Legal capital of the enterprise is not less than $10 million (U.S.);
2. Technology transfer to the enterprise meets at least two of the requirements'; namely:
(a) it is capable of bringing about a considerable improvement in the form and quality
of products, and an increase in output; (b) the method of production is safe; (c) it will
make rational use of energy, natural resources and manpower; and (d) it will not ad-
versely affect the environment.
3. The project should export at least eighty percent of its products or earn at least eighty
percent of its revenue in foreign currencies;
4. The rate of profits of the project is low compared with the average rate obtained in
other projects in the same area;
7. CHERYL W. GRAY & WILLIAM JAROZ, FOREIGN INVESTMENTS LAW IN CENTRAl, AND EASTERN EuRoPE,
WORLD BANK WORMNG PAPER No. 1111, 18 (1993).
8. VIETNAM, ORDINANCE ON TRANSFER OF FOREIGN TECH., art. 4 (Dec. 5, 1988).
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5. The project is located in a region where natural, economic and social conditions are
unfavorable;
6. The investment is made within the first five years of implementation of the Law on
Foreign investments.
This racing commitment method has probably been a contributing factor to the great
inflow of FDI to Vietnam in the early 1990s, following the introduction of the FDI Law.
To compare with China's DFI strategy, which emphasizes technology and exports, Viet-
nam's DFI policy focuses on regional development in addition to export development and
transfer of technology. Regional development has always been Vietnam's major concern as
the northern half of the country is traditionally poorer than the south. The north has been
pushed further backward as a result of long wars and mismanagement under centrally
planned system for forty years. It should be noted, however, that experiences from other
countries, particularly from South Asian countries where the concept of regional devel-
opment by special incentives is very popular, show that promoting regional development
through special incentives packages has not been successful. Vietnam has its own experience
in the notorious case of the oil refinery project Dung-Quat, named after a district in the
poor province of Quang-Ngai in Central Vietnam where infrastructure and other facilities
are lacking. The area is 500 miles from the oil field and also prone to typhoon. The case
involved Total Oil & Gaz of France, which had the project approved but later withdrew it
over a disagreement with the government's imposed location preference for Dung-Quat,
on the basis of regional development priority-the project has now been taken over by the
Russian company RVO Zarubezhneft in a joint venture with VietPetro, a state-owned
enterprise in oil and gas.
C. THE NEw LAW AND THE OLD
Promulgated on November 8, 1996, followed by the application decree of January 1997
to take effect April 1, 1997, the new statute has sixty-eight articles, over twenty more articles
than the old statute which has only thirty-eight articles. Except when indicated otherwise,
the article numbers cited in this paper are provisions of the new statute. Most of the ad-
ditional articles were introduced to elaborate some provisions of the previous statute. For
example, article 58 formalized the role of local authorities in the process of approving FDI
projects.
In terms of substantive law, the new version of the law has the following features:
a) In an effort to remove ambiguities, the new law uses the term direct foreign invest-
ments (article 2.1), as distinct from foreign investments in the language of the old law,
which is commonly used in economics to mean investment in discreet projects, i.e.,
projects in the real sector, as opposed to portfolio investment. This means that some
of the provisions of this law such as tax incentives are not applicable to portfolio
investment.
b) FDI enterprises can have a life of up to fifty years under article 17, instead of twenty
years as under article 16 of the previous law. This provision simply codifies a 1992
amendment to the old statute.
c) Tax privileges, such as a two-year tax holiday, are extended to all FDI enterprises in
article 39; article 27 of the old law provided this tax incentive to joint ventures only,
i.e., excluding enterprises with 100 percent foreign-owned capital and contractual
business cooperation.
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d) The new law now allows existing joint ventures to invest in new joint ventures. En-
terprises with 100 percent foreign-owned capital, however, must give first priority to
Vietnamese nationals in transfer of the company's interests (article 34).
Foreign investors in Vietnam have been concerned about the bureaucratic process of FDI
approval, corporate governance in joint ventures, and the unresolved issue of land-use
rights. The new law addresses these areas of concern, but unfortunately the new provisions
have not completely clarified the concerns. Some of the provisions, such as the one related
to the power of local authorities, may raise more questions than answers.
D. ENTRY LAWS AND EXIT LAws: THE FORMS OF FDI
As part of the legal enclave, the new law retains three specific forms of business enterprises
for FDI, joint venture enterprises, enterprises with 100 percent foreign-owned capital and
Contractual Business Cooperation (CBC) (art. 4 of both the old and the new law). Except
the provisions governing limited liability companies, Vietnam's company laws9 generally
are not applicable to FDI enterprises. As a result, FDI cannot be undertaken by an individual
or sole proprietorship as provided in the Company Law. Further, the new law requires joint
ventures as well as enterprises with 100 percent foreign-owned capital have to form under
the French-type Limited Liability Company (SARL)' ° (arts. 6 and 15), which is a form of
corporation usually used in companies with a restricted number of shareholders, such as
family owned companies. Because shares in a SARL are not freely transferable, FDI enter-
prises are unable to raise capital by floating their shares in the local capital market once the
Vietnam stock market is introduced. Foreign investors cannot own shares in a Vietnamese
company since the company laws require shareholders to be Vietnamese citizens. This
restriction, together with other regulatory requirements such as the submission of an eco-
nomic feasibility study for discreet projects, in effect, bar FDI entry through buy-out or
merger and acquisition.
Like in China, the majority, about eighty percent, of FDI in Vietnam are joint ventures
formed mainly with SOEs. Less than five percent of FDI are 100 percent foreign owned
and about fifteen percent are in contractual business cooperation enterprises. The latter
were formed to carry out short-term, often one shot businesses, for example, one shipment
of import or export cargo.
From a legal point of view, the contractual business cooperation enterprise, which in a
way resembles a limited partnership, differs from joint ventures and 100 percent foreign
owned FDIs in that contractual business cooperation does not create a judicial person or
legal person. On the other hand, under the other two forms of FDI, a new judicial person
is created under a limited liability enterprise, either as a limited liability company fashioned
9. Vietnanr's Company Law and its application decrees are modeled upon the French Company Law to
include (1) a "shareholding company"-similar to the French Soci&6 Anonyme (SA) and (2) a company with
limited responsibility similar to the Sociht6 i Responsabilit6 Limit6 (SARL). Both types are companies of limited
liability. For an analysis of Vienam's Company Laws, see Pham Van Thuyet, Legal Framework for Private Sector
Development in Transitional Economies, The Case of Vietnam, 27 GEo.J. L. & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 541 (1996).
10. For detailed discussion of French company law, see, e.g., Georges Ripert & Rene Robot, Traite de Drit
Commercial, LIBRAIRIE DE DROIT ET DE JURISPRUDENCE (Paris) (1991) or Alfred Jauffret, Manuel de Droit Com-
merial, EDITIoNs LGDJ (Paris) (1991). The provisions for SARL adopted in Vietnam Company Law were
discussed in detail in Pham Van Thuyet's article cited in the preceding footnote.
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after the French SARL, or a Corporation modeled upon the French Soci&6t Anonyme (SA).
One implication is that contractual business cooperation enterprises are governed by con-
tract law in addition to the Foreign Investments Law. In part because only a joint venture
is entitled to tax exemption and tax holidays under the old law (arts. 27-28), FDI has been
concentrated in joint venture enterprises.
To form a joint venture, foreign contribution must be at least thirty percent of total
capital. Foreign partners should make their contribution in foreign exchange, while local
investors' contribution can be in local currency but in most cases local contributions were
in the form of land or land-use rights. Foreign investors can also make their contribution
in the form of equipment and intellectual property, but in practice this type of contribution
has been rare and predictably has caused long delays in approval as a result of difficult
evaluation. Article 7 of the new law states that foreign investors can finance their partici-
pation in joint ventures in local currency if the local currency "were rooted in investment
made in Vietnam." This is a reinvestment issue. The provision simply means that local
currency earned or generated from a FDI project can be reinvested without first converting
it into foreign exchanges; this in effect would lessen the burden on the government to
provide foreign currency for the purpose of reinvestment.
E. INDUSTRIES To BE ENCOURAGED FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
Under Vietnam's policy, FDI should be a project that produces physical output, mostly
new projects, reflecting the government's policy preference for productive undertaking (of-
ten understood as green field projects) as opposed to commercial comprador ventures, a
label used in communist parlance.
Vietnam has sub-sector preferences for FDI, like China and many countries in South
Asia where an outdated inward-looking strategy for development still survives. While China
provides special incentives for FDI engaged in export-oriented industries and high-tech
industries, article 3 of Vietnam's new law provides special treatment for a list of seven broad
sub-sectors and regions where FDI is to be encouraged:"
1. Export-oriented industries;
2. Farming, animal husbandry, forestry development, and processing of agricultural, for-
estry and aquatic products;
3. High-technology industries and know-how industries; industries that protect envi-
ronment or investment in Research and Development;
4. Labor intensive industries using raw materials and natural resources available in Viet-
nam;
5. Infrastructure; and important (undefined but presumably large scale or capital inten-
sive) industries;
6. Investment in highland regions and remote areas;
11. According the old law (art.3), the list of priority industries includes five subsectors as follows: 1) large-
scale industries, export-oriented and import substitution industries; 2) high-technology industries using skilled
labor, investment for full employment and exploitation of potential resources available in Vietnam; 3) labor
intensive industries using raw materials and natural resources available in Vietnam; 4) construction of infra-
structure; and 5) foreign-exchange-earning service industries, such as tourism, ship repair, airport and sea port
services, and other services.
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7. Other underdeveloped regions defined as "having difficult socio-economic condi-
tions."
Except for categories related to regional development, the new list of subsectors of
priority industries is not too different from the old one. But two things are worth noting:
a) It has long been known to foreign lawyers or consultants counseling foreign investors
in Vietnam that the government wants foreign investors to direct their investment to
northern Vietnam, where economic development is lagging behind the south and
poverty is much more pervasive.
b) The new list excludes "service paid in foreign exchange," such as tourism, ship re-
pairing, and airport service, which in effect narrows the types of businesses in which
foreign investors have a comparative advantage.
The use of priority lists, despite its apparent logic, is not a good idea even from Vietnam's
perspective. As bureaucracy breeds itself, what in the beginning was defined to mean a non-
binding list of encouraged industries has in many countries become a bureaucratic instru-
ment of FDI screening, particularly for financial institutions' lending purposes. Experiences
of countries, such as India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, have shown that the use
of lists, a by-product of the inward looking development strategies of the 1960s which were
most popular in South Asia, has been ineffective and counter-productive in the long run.
Vietnam should learn this lesson and abolish these lists.
Like the use of lists, the old-fashioned concept of using tax incentives to promote regional
development has proven ineffective. Experiences by the same South Asia countries have
shown that what investors need most is a reasonably good infrastructure, which is lacking
in underdeveloped areas of the country, in addition to a stable legal framework. Tax incen-
tives alone are not sufficient to lure investors to these areas. Vietnam experienced these
problems when the French oil refinery project at Dung-Quat, mentioned earlier, was with-
drawn.
F. TERMINATION AND LIQUIDATION
In general, an FDI enterprise is established for a period of twenty years. The duration
can be extended for up to fifty years for projects requiring a long gestation period and large
investment. Most current projects are approved for twenty years.
While the procedure for normal termination is reasonably well established, it is not clear
how Vietnam's bankruptcy law is applied to foreign investments enterprises. Joint ventures
can be terminated by mutual agreement or upon expiration of the twenty-year period. In
contrast to the dissolution procedure in the company laws, the dissolution of joint ventures,
whether at expiration or prior to expiration of contract, is handled by a three-member
liquidation committee, which is appointed by the board of directors to settle all pending
obligations and liabilities of the enterprise. In the case of liquidation at expiration, a
committee should be in place six months prior to the expiration date.
The FDI Law provides a guarantee against nationalization or expropriation and a guar-
antee for repatriation of capital and profits.
G. REPATRIATION OF CAPITAL AND TRANSFER OF PROFIT
1. Repatriation of Capital
Upon completion of the liquidation process, the remaining capital can be transferred
abroad over three years in equal installments. This policy of transfer by installment reflects
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the government's concern over an orderly management of foreign exchange and foreign
capital flows. Exceptions can be made to allow the transfer over a shorter period if the
proposed remittance is small, currently one million dollars or less, or if the FDI enterprise
has achieved eighty percent of the foreign exchange earnings budgeted. As FDI laws are
new, and most projects have not been completed, the credibility of this transfer policy for
capital and profit remains to be tested.
2. Profit Remittances
Article 22 of the new law continues to allow both repatriation of capital and profit re-
mittances. In principle, foreign investors may transfer their share of profit and the transfer
must be made in the year in which profit is earned. Foreign workers in FDI enterprises
may also transmit their income overseas. Experiences with transfer of profit have been
mixed: transfer of large amounts faced scrutiny while small amounts were often smuggled
out in tens of thousands dollars by small firms. Both large and small investors complained
about difficulties with getting clearance from tax offices prior to transfer of profit. The most
celebrated case involved Peregrine, a Hong Kong-based investment group that was among
the first major foreign investors coming to Vietnam and one of the few success stories turned
sour. The group was charged with tax evasion and its Resident Representative has been
barred from leaving the country until the case is settled. As the Vietnamese currency, the
Dong, is not convertible and the law does not explicitly guarantee conversion, there may
be a practical problem of foreign exchange availability for purpose of repatriation and re-
mittances. The issue of profit remittances and repatriation of capital in the case of Vietnam,
as in other developing countries, is thus as much an economic problem as a legal issue.
H. RIGHTS TO HIRE AND FIRE
Labor relations in FDI enterprises are regulated by a separate decree"i (Labor Regula-
tions for Enterprises with Foreign Invested Capital). As reflected in this regulation, an FDI
enterprise's right to hire is more constrained than the right to fire. Minimum wage is set
currently at $50 (U.S.) per month (some firms pay more, such as Coca-Cola $80 (U.S.),
and Reebok $67 (U.S.), which is still higher than wages paid by a local enterprise, although
local wages are increasing with expansion of the industrial sector. FDI enterprises are re-
quired to give priority to Vietnamese nationals when recruiting employees. Expatriates can
fill a position when no Vietnamese nationals with comparable skills are available. Hiring is
further constrained by the fact that foreign investors must either select employees recom-
mended by a local government labor agency, or by asking these agencies to do the recruit-
ment. Direct recruitment is allowed only when these agencies fail to provide the required
labor and notify the labor agency. As the country had almost no private labor contracts
under its previous centrally planned economy, detailed formats as well as circumstances for
termination of labor contracts were specified for the first time in the decree on labor reg-
ulations for FDI enterprises. According to this decree, as in market economies, workers
may be fired in the following six instances: 1) consistent failure to carry out assignments;
2) dishonesty; 3) violation of the rules of the enterprises or labor (work) discipline; 4) illness,
injury or disablement not curable or remediable within six months; 5) stoppage or reduction
12. Decree No. 233, HDBT, June 22, 1990.
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of production in case offorce majeure; 6) reduction of production as a result of reorganization
due to changed technology or management.
In the past four years, sporadic labor disputes leading to brief strikes have been reported.
Incidences of labor problems related to the worker/supervisor relationship, abuses and sex-
ual harassment have occurred in several foreign firms. In 1996 a much publicized labor
relations problem involved Nike Vietnam, which has a subcontracting arrangement with
the Korean firm Sam Yang to run its Vietnam operation. It was accused of creating sweat-
shop conditions such as unsafe work environment, low wages, and long hours After this
and other incidents, foreign firms felt the need for staff training programs focusing on
cultural aspects of industrial activities in Vietnam.
Potential conflicts over labor problems between foreign investors and local partners also
may arise when foreign investors, if eventually permitted, gain entry by way of privatization
of SOEs. As most SOEs are over-staffed, foreign investors would like to see reorganization
and streamlining, but will find both difficult to achieve given the deep-rooted egalitarian
culture of SOEs in Socialist Vietnam that makes management unwilling to fire workers.
The Ministry of Labor oversees the enforcement of labor contracts and relations. Trade
union laws, which recognize workers' rights to form trade unions normally associated in-
timately with the Communist Party, are also applicable to FDI enterprises. Labor disputes
have to be first negotiated for settlement, and when this fails the two sides can choose
between a reconciliation council chaired by an official of the Ministry of Labor and con-
sisting of an equal number of representatives from the two sides, or an arbitration council
established and chaired by an official of the Ministry of Labor. The current law does not
provide remedies through court action.
I. THE PHYSICAL ENcLAVE: EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES (EPZ)
Vietnam's enclave-based FDI strategy includes a physical enclave in the form of EPZs,
which are fenced zones. EPZs are new in Vietnam, where the first two projects approved
have completed construction (the first one is the Tan-Thuan EPZ and the second one is
the Linh-Trung EPZ, both in the outskirts of Ho Chi Minh City), and most parts are in
operation. 3
Generally speaking, the EPZ Regulations provide investors inside the Zone more gen-
erous fiscal incentives than the incentive package for foreign investors operating outside
the Zone under the general Foreign Investments Law. Efforts were also made to remove
some of the constraints in the FDI Law, as applied to EPZ investors. For example, EPZ
investors are not required to comply with the minimum wage as under the FDI Law al-
though they are expected to give hiring priority to local labor.
According to the EPZ Regulations, an investor has a choice, within the fenced zones,
between renting a slot to construct individual factories, or leasing or purchasing factories
built by the government or the EPZ Construction Company. Approval of applications for
establishing EPZs is by the authority of the Ministry of Planning and Investment (previously
State Committee for Cooperation and Investment), which is also charged with overseeing
implementation and administration. The procedure for approval of EPZ projects is similar
13. For operational details and economic issues of Viemam's EPZs see VIETNAM: POLICIES FOE TRANSITION
TO AN OPEN EcONOMY, UNDP/WoRLD BANK TRADE ExPANsION PROGRAM CotrNrTr REPORT, ch. 6 (1993).
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to that for other foreign investments projects. The EPZ management, called EPZ Con-
struction and Trading Company, screens admission of individual investors. The duration
of EPZ enterprises is fixed at fifty years and can be extended.
As with the FDI special incentive package, the issue with EPZ is not so much its legal
framework per se as Vietnam's use of other countries' experiences 14 to set out a standard
policy/legal framework for its EPZs. As with FDI special tax treatment, the broad issue
regarding EPZ is its enclave nature, which will not serve the country's long-term interests.
Additionally, as shown in several studies, EPZs generally incur high costs and achieve a low
rate of success and fewer direct benefits to the host country than expected." For the time
being, using EPZ as one of the instruments to provide free trade status to export activities
for international competition can be suitable for Vietnam in the absence of a liberalized
trade policy. EPZs in other words, are only a transitional policy/administrative instrument
and should be part of, not a substitute for, a larger program of policy reform for export
development. They should be phased out when trade is completely liberalized.
In general, legal enclaves for FDI and physical enclaves such as EPZs are both temporary
development instruments that should be used with time-bound validity and phasing-out
procedures in place.
V. Regulatory Impediments to Foreign Investments
A major problem with Vietnam's FDI is its slow pace of implementation, similar to
China's FDI situation in the early years of its open door policy when the FDI implemen-
tation rate was in the range of thirty to forty percent.16 Several factors were responsible for
this slow pace of implementation; most of them are rooted at the country's bureaucratic
system, which also created tremendous impediments even at the initial stage of the invest-
ment approval process. This section reviews some of the more pertinent problems with
regulations affecting foreign investors' decision to invest and the pace of implementation
once the project has been approved.
A. PROBLEMS IN APPROVAL PROCEDURES
1. Bureaucratic Process
The basic law on FDI, the Foreign Investments Law reviewed previously, set out only
the broad principles for FDI and established the State Committee for Cooperation and
Investment (SCCI) headed by a cabinet minister in charge of FDI. In 1995, SCCI was
merged into the Ministry of Planning that became the Ministry of Planning and Investment,
in charge of planning and foreign investments. Subsequent regulatory laws, mainly in the
form of decree, arrete, and circular for application created a myriad of paperwork consti-
tuting a complicated process for FDI approval. Like China, which also has a complicated
FDI bureaucratic process, but unlike Eastern Europe, where there is either no process or
a simplified process for FDI1, Vietnam has a system of sanctioning or approving investment
14. The co-general manager of Tan Thuan EPZ financed by Taiwan capital was also the general manager
of the well-known and successful Kao-Schung EPZ near Taipei.
15. For empirical research results, see DONALD KEESING, ET AL., WORLD BANK COUNTRY ECONOMICS DE-
PARTMENT, EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES (1993).
16. See LAFAR SHAH KHAN, PATTERN oF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN CHINA, WORLD BANK DISCUSSION
PAPER No. 138 (1991).
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involving too many approval agencies of both the central government 8 and provincial gov-
ernment level. As a result, this multiplicity of approvals takes much longer than the man-
datory three months from the date of the application, as stipulated in the FDI Law. A
recent study based on a sample survey of the private sector 19 indicated that the most serious
impediment to foreign investments in Vietnam has been problems with the legal and
regulatory framework affecting the process of project approval and project implementation.
A major problem in the process of approval is the overlapping authority of local govern-
ment, mainly at the provincial level, with the central government. Currently, the central
authority (Project Evaluation Committee) in Hanoi evaluates the proposed projects ac-
cording to nine criteria. Some of these criteria (e.g., legal status of the company, project
sponsor's financial situation) are already on the list of five criteria used by provincial gov-
ernments that, as in China, at times seem jealous over their new found authority as a result
of decentralization.
In accordance with a Ho Chi Minh City's provincial circular that established a new
evaluation unit to exist in parallel with the local SCCI, now a branch of PMI, and the
Central SCCI now part of MPI, a foreign investments project proposal in Ho Chi Minh
City must pass through three layers: (i) eight copies of the project-proposal should be sub-
mitted to the City People's Committee and its Committee for Cooperation and Investment
Evaluation (Project Evaluation Committee of the City) for evaluation; (ii) following a clear-
ance from the City People's Committee, the local SCCI reviews the project to ensure it is
in good order before passing it on to the Central SCCI in the capital city of Hanoi; and
(iii) the Central SCCI will approve or reject the project upon recommendation of the
Central Project Evaluation Committee chaired by the Minister of Planning and Investment.
Complicated approval processes for FDI and investment are not unique to transition
economies, but are common to most developing countries regardless of political orientation.
However, skepticism and lingering suspicions vis-a-vis capitalist investors also play a role
in Vietnam's control-based FDI approval system. Even within this cautious attitude, im-
provements can still be made, along with other procedural streamlining, by collapsing the
three-step process into a single one, eliminating bureaucratic layers involved in essentially
the same assessment process, which duplicates paperwork.
The number of approval agencies at the Central Level can also be reduced considerably
to less than the current eight. For example, the Central Bank (State Bank ofVietnam) should
be involved at the implementation stage when financing is required. Similarly, the Ministry
of Science may have a role later in the process when transfer of new technology may become
an issue. The planning branch of the MPI should not be burdened with project review when
the country has basically eliminated the concept and practice of central planning. The re-
duction of the number of approval agencies also strengthens the sanctioning authority of
MPI and is an essential step towards the contemplated one-door service institution.
17. See GRAY, supra note 7; see also KHAN, supra note 4.
18. At the central government, approvals are required from eight agencies including the State Planning
Commission, Finance Ministry, Ministry of Commerce and Trade, Ministry of Science, Ministry of Construc-
tion, State Bank (Central Bank) and "other Ministries relevant to the sub-sector in question." Cabinet Decision
No. 366, HDBT, Nov. 7, 1991.
19. FOREION TRADE & INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CENTER (FTDC), VIETNAM: A SMALL PRIVArE SECTOR
SURVEY, FiNAscia& SECTOR REVIEW MIssION (1995). The survey was supervised by the author of this paper who
participated in the mission.
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The ideal way to remedy process problems resulting from procedural laws is to have no
process, as currently is the case in many CEE countries, for no optimal process can exist
in a large bureaucracy. The second-best solution is to streamline the process, cutting out
as much as possible the institutional layers and their attendant regulatory requirements.
2. The Feasibility Study Requirement
A FDI is required to have a feasibility study. As long as the country has trade barriers,
the government will be interested in the economic analysis (the core of a feasibility study)
of the project to ensure that the project is not harmful economically-not proposed for
negative value-added industries at world prices. However, most, if not all, of the feasibility
studies submitted to SCCI are only simple pre-investment studies subject to further detailed
engineering study prior to project implementation. But even if these studies are sufficiently
detailed and properly done, including a cost/benefit analysis with the use of proper shadow
pricing, these studies are most useful to financing institutions, which should gauge the
financial viability of the project in making their lending decisions. Furthermore, moving
the incentive structure close to world prices would reduce immensely the whole problem
of economic analysis. In the meantime, when the incentive structure is still distorted as in
Vietnam, feasibility studies and particularly economic analysis therein should be required
for large projects and not for smaller scale projects.
B. PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTATION
Once the long-awaited approval of the project proposal is obtained, foreign investors
must confront a variety of problems in implementation. The problems arise from start-up
to the time the project is on-stream. These problems include the country's notorious cor-
ruption, which is pervasive and known to the government but hard to document. A recent
study reveals some of the more common problem areas reported by foreign investors. 0
Some of these problems are often found in other developing countries, while others, par-
ticularly the legal framework issues, are typical of an economy in transition. Several FDI
projects have been withdrawn due to such obstacles. Apart from the early birds mentioned
earlier, Mitsui of Japan, Petronas of Malaysia, the mining company Austing of Australia,
City Horse of Hong Kong, and Australia's ACP, which used to participate in the well-
known publication Vietnam Investment Review, are among the other frustrated investors who
are leaving Vietnam. Implementation problems caused delays in production, resulting in
increases in sunk cost (just as approval problems did), and affecting project viability. No
study on the financial performance of FDI in Vietnam is available, but events and pro-
nouncements by investors point to a negative assessment. For example, Procter & Gamble
(P&G), the Cincinnati, Ohio-based toiletries giant, launched its Vietnam operation in 1996
with a $14.3 million joint venture. Reportedly, P & G has lost $28 million so far and had
to consider increasing its investment to survive or face bankruptcy. The company said that
costs have since proven "significantly higher" than expected.' James Rockwell's consulting
business, Vatico Inc., whose clients included Chrysler, IBM, Hughes Aircraft, and Amway
Corp, was the first American company licensed to operate, but closed its doors on June 30,
1997, after six years in Vietnam. In Rockwell's opinion, "If ten percent of foreign invested
companies in Vietnam are making a profit, I'd be surprised."22
20. See id.
21. P&G Seeks to Raise Investment in Vietnam to Avert Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 20, 1997.
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C. START-UP PROBLEMS
Most of the start-up problems of implementation were caused by red tape at the local
government level. Start-up problems include difficulties with clearing the site and delays
in securing building permits, power lines, and water supply. Delay is also common in im-
porting machinery and equipment as a result of difficulties in obtaining an import permit
in custom clearance. To accomplish all these steps, investors must complete a myriad of
paperwork for numerous large and small bureaucracies and, in many places, face corruption
in the form of bribing (referred to as toll gates2 ) to expedite the process.
D. PROBLEMS AT OPERATIONAL STAGE
When the project goes on stream, the foreign investor must confront more problems,
many related to the regulatory framework. Two areas in which the investor would have to
deal in the course of managing its daily businesses are the restrictive and highly protective
trade regime 2 4 and the financial sector, in which banking activities are limited by restrictive
regulations and borrowing is constrained by an unstable legal system that does not recognize
private ownership of land preventing the use of real property as collateral for lending pur-
poses. The problems in both areas are deep-rooted in Vietnam's control-based policy for
both trade and banking, which created an ever-increasing number of rules and regulations.
These regulations change through the implementation of a project.
1. Trade Restriction
a. Subsector Restrictions
Two major problems with Vietnam's trade laws have caused many difficulties for inves-
tors: the subsector restriction and the highly protective foreign trade regime that is effec-
tively biased against the private sector, both domestic and foreign. The 1990 Law on Private
Business (art. 5) lists seven sectors that require investment permission from the Prime
Minister himself: (1) production and trading of explosives, poisons, toxic chemicals; (2) ex-
ploitation of all kinds of precious minerals; (3) production and supply of electricity and
water on a large scale; (4) production of facilities for communication broadcast, services
related to post and telecommunications, radio and TV broadcast, publishing; (5) sea and
air transport; (6) import-export trading; and (7) international tourism. Many of these sec-
tors, such as import/export, are routine activities of the private sector in a market economy
and should be liberalized. This particular restriction on subsectors has in effect created a
virtual monopoly in foreign trade for State enterprises; of the thousands of trade permits
issued, only a handful are given to the private sector. Private trading firms must go through
one of over a thousand SOEs who hold trade permits and act as intermediaries for a fee
(officially, a commission of one percent is charged). This is perhaps the most serious reg-
22. First US. Investor to Vietnam Heads Home, Others May Follow, BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 29, 1998.
23. The term was used most recently in a speech. Jules Carson, Chair of the American Business Community
in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam: Great or Not-so-Great for Foreign Investments?, Speech (une 1998). Carson
said, "... . There are simply too many toll gates, ministries, customs officials, tax collectors, inspectors, People's
Committees, quotas, licenses, chops, etc. than many managers can manage and still run a profitable business
24. VIETNAM: POLICIES FOR TRANSITION TO AN OPEN ECONOMY, UNDP/WoRLD BANK TRADE ExPANsION
PROGRAM CoUNTRY REPORT chs. 5 & 6 (Sept. 1993).
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ulatory impediment to private sector development as trade liberalization is a crucial step in
the transition to a market economy.
b. Trade Policy Restrictions: High Tariffs and Quantitative Restrictions (QRs)
Vietnam's current trade policy and trade laws are highly protective, featuring both QRs
and a widely dispersed tariff structure. Investors may benefit from protective tariffs and QRs
in favor of their domestically produced goods, but a highly protective trade regime is biased
against export activities and in the long run will not promote efficiency of domestic industries,
including those developed by foreign investors. Vietnam's current tariff schedule contains as
many as twenty-five rates varying from one to 200 percent C.I.E values. Variations in tariffs
are harmful-even more harmful than high but uniform tariffs-because they tend to shift
resources to inefficient activities. As a result of this trade policy, several major foreign invest-
ments projects have been proposed for such inefficient but protected industries as car and
scooter assembly. The need for Vietnam to liberalize foreign trade is a persistent subject of
debate within the government and by aid donor countries. The government took some initial
steps towards liberalization, but further progress will be slowed by resistance from vested
interest groups including protected industries, the control mind-set of policymakers, and lack
of understanding of the complex relationship between trade liberalization and growth. Under
these constraints, Vietnam's international competitiveness beyond some traditional exports
will be slow to improve.
2. Banking Problems and Lack of Financing
In principle, foreign investors are allowed to borrow from the domestic capital market.
In practice, while working capital is available to a few customers in a limited number of
export industries, term financing beyond one or two years is not available in the country's
nascent banking system. Currently, both domestic and foreign investments are self-financed,
although in a strict legal sense, firms can be leveraged up to seventy percent (only thirty
percent to be paid-in, which is the amount of legal capital required). The lack of financing
and undeveloped banking system forced foreign investors to arrange financing overseas,
which resulted in slower implementation and high transaction costs. The country's almost
non-check banking system and the system's newness impose further constraints on project
implementation as all transactions are carried out in cash. A number of recent regulations
restricted further banking activities, particularly foreign banks. For example, a November
1997 regulation by the State Bank (Central Bank) limited open positions on hard currency
held by foreign banks to less than $2 million; any bank with more than that would be forced
to sell on the interbank market. Such a requirement would reduce competition and increase
the cost of raising investment capital. A November 1998 regulation requires further that
banks must sell for local currency (Dong) eighty percent of all foreign currencies held by
firms. In view of this rule and the unstable Vietnamese currency, it is likely that foreign
firms must keep most of their foreign exchange holdings in off-shore accounts. A 1997
regulation on checking accounts illustrated Vietnam's tendency to over-regulate and restrict
its newborn banking activities."5 According to this regulation, Vietnam, unlike other coun-
tries in South East Asia where checks are valid for six months and can be written in English,
has ruled that checks are valid for only fifteen days and must be written in Vietnamese
25. See e.g., ASIA TIMES, Mar. 13, 1997.
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(English could be added but in smaller letters underneath). The first letter of the sum in
words must be capitalized and there must be no blank spaces or mistakes in filling out the
checks (e.g., initialed correction is not allowed.) Furthermore, checks must be one exact
size specified by the State Bank, and must be printed by the State Bank's print shop, which
has no capacity for security printing common in other countries. For companies, the chief
accountant must countersign every check. In addition, individuals are only able to purchase
one book of ten checks at a time, and companies are only allowed three ten-check books.
The above regulations have discouraged the use of checks as means of payment in Vietnam,
where in 1997 a population of 75 million people held fewer than 41,000 checking accounts.
Because of these regulatory constraints, Vietnam will remain a cash-based society for a long
time. But the most damaging regulation was a recent decision by Vietnam's Supreme Peo-
ples Court, which ruled that banks are not responsible for the letters of credits they issue.
This unusual decision speaks not only to the unreliability of Vietnam's banking system, but
more seriously to the unpredictability of the country's legal system.
E. REGULATIONS FOR DOMESTIC INVESTMENT
Domestic investors have not been in a better position than foreign investors. All the
studies done in recent years26 on Vietnam's emerging private sector reveal the same obstacles
to domestic investment but in a different order; they include among other things, a poor
basic physical infrastructure, a primitive banking system and an unstable system of laws and
regulations. Unlike foreign investors, domestic investors worry less about legal framework
problems than other impediments, such as the lack of bank financing. Like other Asian
investors, they are accustomed to dealing with in an informal legal framework.
In general, Vietnam's reborn private sector must operate within a more restrictive reg-
ulatory framework 7 than do foreign investors, in part because the government is still strug-
gling with the philosophical issue of how compatible a liberated economy and an expanded
private sector can be with a socialist political structure. Unlike their colleagues in Eastern
Europe, Vietnam's policymakers do not have a clean slate upon which they may promote
private investment and private sector development.
For the domestic investor, the process of investment approval is less clear, but not as
complicated as the one for FDI; it also involves a time-consuming period of security in-
vestigation prior to registration and project evaluation. Beyond approval, domestic investors
like foreign investors must face a host of regulations affecting implementation including
import/export restrictions, land regulations, utilities problems, a deficient banking/credit
system, and an uncertain legal framework.
Two new laws, the Company Law and Private Business Law, while helping to clarify the
forms of doing business, do not help promote deregulation. The Law on Companies (Com-
pany Law) essentially reintroduced two French-style companies of limited liability familiar
to Vietnam's private sector-the Societ6 Anonyme (SA), similar to a corporation and the
Societ6 a Responsabilit6 Limit~e (SARL), somewhat similar to a limited partnership. In
addition to the Company Law, Vietnam has a Law on Private Business, enacted December
2, 1990, that is essentially a detailed limitation on what is already in the new Constitution
26. See, e.g., Per Ronnas: Employment Creation Through Private Entrepreneurship in Vietnam, ILO/SIDA(1992);
FTDC, supra note 19.
27. For a detailed analysis, see Van Thuyet, supra note 9.
FALL 1999
786 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
regarding the extent to which the private sector can do business. This kind of law, basically
redundant in a market economy, may be necessary for assurance of the legality of com-
mercial activities by the emerging private sector. In a matured market economy such a law
should not be on the books. In its efforts to reestablish a market economy, Vietnam should
resist the temptation to go overboard in making new laws. A liberated economy requires
fewer instead of more laws beyond the basic codes or statutes.
Apart from restrictions on seven subsectors requiring the Prime Minister's permission as
mentioned, the Law on Private Business imposes further entry barriers through a minimum
capital requirement for each activity of private businesses. This type of restriction is not
found anywhere else in Asia. The law lists minimum capital requirements for eighteen
activities, ranging from $25,000 for hydropower (probably activities supporting a hydro-
power plant), the highest, to $2,500 for handicrafts and restaurants, the lowest. A similar
list for companies is also attached to the Company Law, with capital requirements roughly
ten times higher than those for the corresponding unincorporated enterprises. The Law
on Private Business contains a final clause to deal with violations of the law, mainly non-
compliance with business license regulation and change of activities without permission.
Curiously, the clause envisages criminal prosecution for these purely civil actions. However,
no penalty is specified.
VI. Substantive Law Issues
As discussed in the previous section, procedural problems have presented major obstacles
to foreign investors when they first consider entering Vietnam, and unresolved issues of
substantive law discovered in the process of dealing with their local counterparts, the gov-
ernment and the laws have made investment decisions more difficult. This section reviews
some of the more controversial issues causing concern to most foreign investors but re-
maining largely unresolved. Those issues are corporate governance in joint ventures, land
use rights and intellectual property rights.
A. ISSUES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR FDI
Regulations on corporate control and monitoring for FDI enterprises are in the Foreign
Investment Law. Some provisions of the FDI law regarding organization are similar to the
Company Law, but many others depart from it. Because Vietnam's Company Law is not
applicable to FDI, comparisons between the two laws would show a bias against foreign
investors. For example, the form of management organization specified for a FDI enterprise
is broadly in line with the provision of the Company Law for domestic organizations which
includes the Board of Management, the Director General, and other specified officials, but
the voting rights of board members in a FDI firm do not reflect proportional shareholders'
rights as in the Company Law. Other significant deviations from the Company Law and
normal practice in other countries are demonstrated by the rules of decision-making and
the prerogatives of the company officers of a FDI firm. In a joint venture, the parties appoint
members to the board of management in proportion to their capital contribution. However,
both parties must have at least two representatives each on the board of management,
regardless of their capital contribution. Furthermore, if more than two parties are involved,
the minimum number of board members is one seat per party involved, regardless of their
respective proportional holdings.
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B. Two-CAPTAIN SHIP CLAUSE
Unlike the Company Law, which refers the Board's decision-making rules to the by-laws
for joint ventures, the Foreign Investments Law stipulates in Article 13 of the old FDI Law
that decisions on "principal matters which relate to the organization and operation of the
joint venture, namely its business objectives, business planning, and key personnel," may
only be made by a unanimous vote of the board. This effectively gives each party involved
the power to veto any decisions on these matters, a situation dubbed a two-captain ship
clause by foreign investors in Vietnam. This veto provision is clearly a major impediment
to effective management, goes against the rule of majority based on proportional holdings,
and has deterred many foreign investors from forming joint ventures in Vietnam. All other
decisions must be supported by a two-thirds majority. The chairman of the board must be
appointed by consensus, but the law is silent about the chairman's powers. The new law
still retains this principle of unanimity but spells out the areas of its applicability, including
the appointment of the Director General (President), the First Deputy Director General
(First Vice President), the Chief Accountant (Treasurer), the amendments of By-laws, ap-
proval of financial statements, and decisions on construction projects and borrowing for
investments (art. 14). The new provision thus removed the uncertainty inherent in the old
overbroad provision, but still constrains efficient management of a joint-venture enterprise
and limits the authority of foreign partners who almost always represent the majority of
shareholders as they normally contribute seventy percent of the joint-venture's capital.
C. LAND-USE RIGHTS ISSUES
As Vietnam still maintains its communist regime, all land belongs to the State in line
with socialist ideology, (or "belongs to the People," according to the language of the Con-
stitution). To circumvent this legal obstacle to transition to a market economy, in which
ownership of real property normally remains private, Vietnam, like China, developed a
legal framework for real property based on long-term land-use rights in order to establish
a market for real property. Land-use rights in this form constitute quasi-ownership. This
quasi-ownership includes rights to use, to usufruct, but not to sell real property."
Land-use rights may be transferred, although the land itself cannot be transferred. Land-
use rights were defined for the first time in the Land Law, then later in Part V of the Civil
Code promulgated on November 9, 1995. The Code discusses in four chapters various
forms of ownership for personal and real property. For the latter, the Code reiterates the
concept of state ownership of all land. For business purposes, the Land Law that contains
details translating the concept of state ownership of land into practical application is more
relevant than the Civil Code.
As in other areas of laws, land law evolved in response to reality and changing political
orientation. Prior to 1988, there was no need for a land law, as private farming was not
allowed in rural areas, and private business was almost non-existent in urban areas. Land
28. Article 14 clarifies what specific decisions require unanimity of vote: "The most important matters of
organization and activities requiring unanimous vote of members attending Board meeting for decisions are:
appointment of Director General (President), First Deputy Director General (First Vice President), Chief
Accountant (Treasurer), amending Bylaws, approval of Annual financial statements and construction projects,
and borrowing money for investment."
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management was conducted through administrative decisions at local government levels.
The new Land Law promulgated on July 24, 1993, and its attendant application decree
provide details on the hierarchy of types of property ownership and set out the regulations
on the right to use, to inherit and to transfer the right to use.29 In practice, the land-use
right system encountered numerous problems both because of ambiguities in the legal texts
and frequent changes of black letter laws.
For foreign investments, land-use rights have created two major problems: one relates
to evaluating the value of land-use rights in the real property market and the other relates
to the recent transition of land-use rights into rents.
1. The Pricing Problem of Land- Use Rigbts
The Land Law categorizes six types of land for the purposes of charging fees for use,
and for property tax, rentals and compensation in case of retrieval (re-expropriation). The
six categories are 1) agricultural land, 2) forest land, 3) rural settlements, 4) urban land,
5) land for specialized uses, and 6) unutilized (green field) land. There is a basic rent sched-
ule for each region, which may change over time. Until recently, most homeowners in
urban areas paid property tax on land but not fees for the right to use it. For foreign
investments, contribution by local counterparts to most joint ventures was almost always
in land-use rights for which the value is uncertain and has become the subject of protected
negotiations. Partly for this reason, foreign investors sometimes prefer the 100 percent
foreign-owned form of investment.
2. The Instability of Land-Use Rights Laws: Land-Use Rights vs. Rents
Two new laws, in the form of decree/circular, have changed the land-use rights situation
in Vietnam and caused further complications for foreign investments. The first law3° re-
quires the collection of 100 percent of the new fee assessed for land-use rights to be paid
by the holder or seller. The new fees charged for land-use rights are very high. In some
areas in Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon), the fee may be as high as $1,300 per square meter.
The new decision has also frozen the real property market because the new regulation on
land-use rights increased real estate prices enormously. This decision has caused strong
protests from homeowners. Ho Chi Minh City has petitioned the central government to
review and rescind the circular.
The second law,"' which requires all land-use rights on commercial properties to be
transformed into land leases, has caused an even stronger protest and created considerable
confusion. With regard to foreign investments, the new regulation raised a new issue of
land value contributed as equity by the Vietnamese counterparts in joint ventures with
foreign investors. As mentioned, for joint ventures in Vietnam, the contribution in equity
by the Vietnamese side has almost always been in the form of land-use rights acquired by
state-owned enterprises-these enterprises in effect own land on behalf of the state by virtue
of their state enterprise status. When the land is to be used as equity in a joint venture with
foreign investors, the dollar value of this land or the land-use rights has been the subject
of intense negotiations between foreign investors and their local counterparts. The local
29. For a detailed treatment of Land Law and other property laws, see Van Thuyet, supra note 9, at 548-
56.
30. Finance Ministry Circular No. 02.
31. Decree No. 18, Feb. 13,1995, applicable retroactively to Jan. 1,1995.
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counterparts typically would claim they wanted to contribute fifty to fifty-one percent of
the assets of the joint venture, regardless of the size or location of the lot. The final settle-
ment is usually the result of a bargain with no rational basis to support it, but the land value
is never fixed at less than thirty percent of the assets of the joint venture to be formed.
Under the new law, the value of land is reduced to the rentals the Vietnamese counterparts
must pay the government since they now no longer own land-use rights but simply a right
to sublease or assignment; the value of their long-term land-use rights normally is greater
than the rents they must pay the government. Foreign investors now claim a downward
revision of the equity contribution by local counterparts, but in practice they have not
succeeded, as the whole issue of implementing the new law remains unresolved.
The new regulation in effect nullified the quasi-ownership of land intended under the
concept of long-term land-use rights. The regulation has made the land law more unstable
and is a fearful example of the unpredictability of Vietnam's legal framework to the extent
that an administrative decree can change substantive law.I Apart from creating confusion for FDI management, the new regulation seriously impacts
the working of the financial market. In principle, mortgaging of real property is legally
possible based on provisions of the Land Law (art. 3) which allow pledging the land-use
right, and of the Housing Law (art. 7), which allows pledging of the house attached to the
land. In practice, mortgages were rare because of difficulties in ascertaining title and prob-
lems involved in foreclosures. Some domestic banks in Ho Chi Minh City began to accept,
on an experimental basis, ownership papers for residential houses and commercial buildings
as collateral for short-term loans. The new regulation is causing disturbances in the financial
sector because banks no longer accept land-use rights as collateral for loans. In fact, some
banks have started to recall loans made previously on the basis of land-use rights.
D. PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Protection of intellectual property has been a major concern of foreign investors par-
ticularly when their businesses are based on proprietary technology, such as brand name
products in garment and footwear industry (Nike, Adidas and Reebok), in soft drinks
(Coca-cola and Pepsi Cola) and in pharmaceuticals. On June 2 7, 1997, Vietnam signed an
agreement with the United States on copyright protection. It remains to be seen how the
agreement will be implemented.
Vietnam's legal reform roughly parallels China's efforts"2 both in areas covered and in
terms of timing. Various ordinances and decrees"3 protect four other intellectual properties
in addition to trademarks, which is the most important intellectual property in the context
of Vietnam's transition: patents, utility solutions, industrial designs, and appellation of or-
igin of products.14 Another category called industrial secret (trade secret) was added35 to
32. Decree No. 18, Feb. 13, 1995 and applicable retroactively to Jan. 1, 1995. See, e.g., RALPH H. FOLSON,
ET AL., LAW AND POLITICS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 372 (1992).
33. All five categories are governed by Decree No. 84 on Protection of Intellectual Property, HDBT, Mar.
20, 1990, Decree No. 201, HDBT, Dec. 28, 1988, and Arrete 49, HDBT, Apr. 3, 1991, on Transfer of
Technology amending Decree No. 197, HDBT, Dec. 14, 1982. These texts establish both substantive and
procedural laws for intellectual property protection.
34. Trademark is defined as a symbol used to distinguish goods or services of the same kind from different
production or commercial units. Inventions are technical solutions that present "world-wide novelty" and
represent an inventive step applicable in a socio-economic field. Utility solutions are defined as the application
of an old (patentable) technology in a new and previously unused way in Vietnam. A registrant can obtain a
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regulate the transfer of technology through licensing, although this category was not de-
fined. Current laws provide the rights to possession, to use and to transfer over the protected
objects. Most of the above laws on intellectual property have now been codified in Part Six
of the 1995 Civil Code.
1. Characteristics
Vietnam's system of intellectual property protection adopts the "first to file" rule for the
most part while most other countries adopt the "first to use" rule. About 50,000 trademarks
have been registered under current laws. The use of the "first to file" rule could create
litigation over an intellectual property that was pirated but properly filed prior to the au-
thentic filing by the actual foreign owner. To remedy this problem, those who have utilized
the property prior to and independently of the applicant for protection have the right to
continue to use the property but are not allowed to extend the period of utilization or
transfer it; and the government created a grace period for foreign owners to file their
trademark on the basis of evidence that they were the "first to use," accommodating the
legal practice of their home country. These measures will not settle the problem once and
for all.
Some language of the law, while reflecting socialist features apparently cosmetic in nature,
can be construed to create substantial regulatory impediments. For example, an owner of
an intellectual right "is obliged to use or transfer in Vietnam in a way compatible with the
need of social and economic development of the country." 6 This legal language provides
broad discretion for implementation agencies to infringe upon ownership rights.
Another potential problem lies in the appropriation provision. Intellectual property can be
expropriated if the Chairman of the State Committee for Science (SCS),37 who is charged
with overseeing the implementation of government policy in this field, "considers it necessary
to use the protected invention, utility solution or industrial design for Vietnam's national
defense or security or the prevention of treatment of human diseases or for other vital inter-
ests." Despite a provision for adequate compensation, the possibility of expropriation casts a
shadow of uncertainty on Vietnam's intellectual property policy.
E. ENFORCEMENT FOR PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The duration of protection is generally fifteen years from filing date (China also provides
fifteen years protection). The country is also a signatory of the Paris Convention, the Ma-
drid Agreement, and the Stockholm Convention, s Vietnam's participation in these inter-
certificate that protects the new application for six years. Industrial designs are defined as the specific appearance
of a product embodied by lines, three-dimensional forms, colors or a combination of these, which is new on a
world-wide basis and capable of serving as a pattern for a product of industry or handicraft. Appellation of
origin is the geographical name of a country or locality that serves to designate the origin of a product man-
ufactured in that county or locality, provided that its qualities and characteristics are due exclusively or essen-
tially to the geographical environment, including natural or human factors, or a combination thereof.
35. Decree No. 201, No. HDBT, Dec. 28, 1988.
36. Obligations of Intellectual Property Owners-Decree-Law No. 13, LOT/HDNN8, art. 13, Nov. 2,
1989
37. Now the Minister for Science and Environment.
38. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, allows the owner of a
trademark to claim a priority in a foreign country to the date of the initial filing in its home country. At present,
there are more than 80 signatories to the Paris Convention. The Madrid Agreement, Apr. 14, 1891, allows
VOL. 33, NO. 3
VIETNAM'S LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT 791
national protection conventions would greatly facilitate the flow of FDI and transfer of
technology in the R&D-intensive sub-sectors and proprietary technology-based industries
such as pharmaceutical and other chemicals where a good legal framework to protect pro-
prietary technology is critical. In order to activate any of these agreements or any bilateral
agreements for the purpose of securing protection or negotiation over technology transfer,
the foreign party must state in the application letter its adherence to these specific agree-
ments. Because of the newness of the field in relation to the country's transition to a market
economy, Vietnam's legal documentation on intellectual property protection is at times
confusing and should be strengthened1 Currently, a foreign owner of intellectual property
must refer to numerous laws and regulations, including both the Decree-Law on Intellectual
Property Rights and the Law on Technology Transfer, and several application arretes for
an adequate coverage of the subject. The Law on Technology Transfer overlaps with the
Law on Acquisition of Technology Through Licensing. Regarding transfer of technology,
the issue is not so much legal as economic, involving not only the preparation of clear rules
and regulations but also conceptual aspects of technology policy to be adopted.-
Protection against trademark infringement may be sought through the NOI, which can
grant injunctions against the infringer and prevent future may infringements, but has no
power to grant compensation for loss. In principle, remedies may be sought through the
Peoples Court System. As Vietnam just reintroduced its market-oriented legal system, its
courts have limited experience in dealing with these and other commercial matters.
VII. Legal Infrastructure and Law Enforcement
Despite legislative efforts in recent years, Vietnam's legal framework remains essentially
informal and unstructured. There are laws on the books, but enforcement is weak. Regu-
latory laws in the form of decree, arrete, circular, and administrative decisions often overtake
the basic statutes as has been the case of FDI legal framework. Law enforcement is not
uniform but varies depending on the area of law and the parties involved in the lawsuit.
Dispute resolution is conducted in People's Courts where lay assessors have the same powers
as the judge. A concept of constitutional fairness and justice, akin to the notion of due
process, has only begun to take root. This section reviews some of the law enforcement
issues more pertinent to business activities, particularly foreign investments, focusing on
commercial disputes.
signatory parties who have registered a trademark in their home countries to register the trademark in all
member countries by depositing a certificate of registration with the central registration bureau in Berne,
Switzerland. The Stockholm Convention, July 14, 1967, established the World Intellectual Property Organi-
zation (WIPO), a U.N. organization that offers registration services for intellectual property and which facili-
tates the transfer of intellectual property from developed countries to the developing world.
39. For a Survey of Literature, see STRENGTHENING PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE, WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPER No. 112 (Wolfgang E. Siebeck,
ed. 1990). The study has a very extensive bibliography.
40. Several issues of this nature are discussed in RESEARCH POLICY INsTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF LUND, SWEDEN,
& INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE MANAGEMENT, HANOI, VIETNAM, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO VIETNAM: AN INTERIM
REPORT, DISCUSSION PAPER No. 181 (1987); NGUYEN THAN HA, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO VIETNAM, HIs-
TORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS, RESEARCH POLICY INSTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF LUND, SWEDEN (1989).
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A. VIETNAM'S LEGAL PROFESSION AND LEGAL EDUCATION
Vietnam's legal profession is only emerging. Bar associations are being established, and
offices of Notary Public in the civil code tradition, which requires a notary to have a sub-
stantial legal training, have been established in most cities. Professional judges and attor-
neys, particularly the younger ones, are trying to improve their legal education through
continuing education and other programs. Lawyers' standing in society is also enhanced
along with their earnings, which are no longer constrained by fee limitations. Apart from
the more restricted bar association, each large city also has a lawyer association made up of
professional attorneys as well as jurist, who are former members of the Judiciary or simply
persons who are interested in the laws and have learned them on their own. Ho Chi Minh
City and Hanoi, the capital, each have a bar association with membership requirements of
training at a law school and passing a bar examination that includes, not surprisingly, so-
cialist political doctrines. Ho Chi Minh City's Bar, with about 150 members, has been
expanded in recent years to include several lawyers who had received their legal training in
one of the law schools before 1975. This group of new attorneys has been trained in the
standard law curriculum somewhat similar to the France's four- year law school program.
Until recent years, these lawyers had not been allowed to practice because they were con-
sidered not politically able to function as socialist attorneys. After several years of reform
and transition to a market economy, the government felt the need to have a corps of lawyers
familiar with the market economy to help the judiciary cope with new types of litigation.
Most of these capitalist lawyers were required to take short courses on Marxist political
doctrines before being allowed to practice. The rest of the bar members received their legal
training in the socialist tradition in Vietnam or in some other communist countries, and
are unfamiliar with market-based legal systems, particularly in matters of contract and com-
mercial law.
Several foreign law, firms including big names from the United States, such as Baker &
McKenzie and White & Case have set up offices in Vietnam in anticipation of Vietnam's
booming private sector activities, particularly foreign investments. Foreign law firms, how-
ever, have discovered that their initial optimism is fading, first because foreign investments
slowed down and also because their professional activities have been gradually restricted
over the years. For example, beginning in 1995 foreign lawyers were not allowed to practice
Vietnamese law. To overcome this limitation, foreign law firms hired local lawyers to file
briefs prepared by foreign lawyers whenever local laws were involved; this practice has
resulted in increased transaction costs and delay in the legal process.
B. LEGAL EDUCATION
Vietnam has begun to change its law school curricula to educate lawyers in a manner
more suitable to market economy activities and to meet the needs of a society desiring more
rules of law. The changed curriculum although sketchy, now reads much like a standard
law school program in the West, except for a few traditional subjects on Marxism, a must
in any Vietnamese school.
As in other areas of Humanities or Social Sciences, the problem with changing study
programs to meet the needs of Vietnam's transition is the lack of educators to implement
the new programs. The shortage is most acute in law and economics. The United Nations
Development Program, The World Bank, the American Bar Association, and other groups
in Europe have considered assistance in this area, but for a variety of reasons, including the
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government's reluctance to seek foreign assistance with its legal framework, not much pro-
gress has been made. Within the country, a group of lawyers trained in the West were
allowed to set up a private law school in Ho Chi Minh City in 1994. In an attempt to
control legal teaching, the school was ordered to close after one rather successful year in
business, and folded into the state law school, which operates under government control.
This was an unfortunate decision, as Vietnam needs more quality legal training institutions
if it seriously considers introducing a rule of law system.
The quality of professional judges is crucial, as Vietnam's system of dispute resolution is
inquisitional, in keeping with the civil code tradition, as opposed to the common law ad-
versary system. This is an area of concern as legal training in Vietnam is in transition and
the professional quality of judges is uneven.
C. DUE PROCESS IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIALIST VIETNAM
Vietnam has established procedures for both civil and criminal cases. 41 With the exception
of the role of the Procuracy, Vietnam's civil and criminal procedures draw from the French
codes. Vietnam's constitution does not use the term due process of law, but guarantees its
citizens' property against nationalization, provides for compensation in case of nationali-
zation, and requires that all arrests and imprisonment are done according to the rule of law.
These and other provisions in the criminal law and procedure also seem to suggest the
equivalent of due process of law. But there are constraints on how and what may be invoked
to dispute a procedural or substantive law. To begin with, Vietnam has no judicial review
of laws. The legislature reviews its own legislation and the laws of other government
branches. Even if the validity of a law can be challenged, the question of whether or not a
law or government act is deemed to be in furtherance of a legitimate governmental objec-
tive-to justify a deviation from substantive due process-should be understood in the
context of Vietnam's centralized democracy (art. 6 of the Constitution) in which the Com-
munist Party is "leading the State and the Society" (art. 4). In this context, it would not be
surprising if the concept of compelling government interest, as often invoked in American
law under the notion of substantive due process, would be broadened by the Vietnamese
government under its system of centralized democracy. Similarly, a law that may restrict
fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech and freedom of association, in violation of
substantive due process in other societies, may not be inconsistent with Vietnam's concept
of centralized democracy. For the same reasons, the notion of procedural fairness or pro-
cedural due process may also be subject to government's interests considered compelling
or legitimate by Vietnam's government and its political system. In other words, due process
of law in the Vietnamese legal framework must be related to factual context and ideology
for its rationale and understanding.
As in other countries, due process of law in Vietnam or the equivalent of it is not a fixed
notion. Its content changes with time and circumstances. For the time being, Vietnam's
procedural fairness seems better observed in ordinary criminal cases than in cases involving
political acts of opposition, which are often labeled as criminal or violating national security.
Due process is also better practiced in major cities than at the district and local levels.
A setback for Vietnam's due process laws was the Prime Minister's decree No. 31 on
Administrative Restriction on Persons, promulgated on April 14, 1997. The new decree
41. DECREE-LAW FOR CIVIL CASES, Nov. 29, 1989; CODE CRIM. P., Jan. 1, 1989.
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allows police and local governments to arrest and restrict movement of any person who is
deemed to "have an act that violates the laws or harmful to national security as stipulated
in Chapter 1 of the Criminal Code, but the act has not reached the level serious enough
to be criminally prosecuted" (art. 2). The decree stipulated that "such person's movement
will be restricted within his/her residence district, he or she may be relocated within the
province if national security so required, will be forced to follow an reeducation program
including reeducation through labor and to report Police once a month." The duration for
such a measure will be fixed case by case as the decree does not fix the maximum period of
restraint. In a different political system, such a of measure might have been an illegal or
gross violation of both procedural and substantive due process, but presumably it was con-
sidered within the compelling interests of Vietnam's socialist government and therefore
acceptable to it and to the judiciary.
D. THE COURT SYSTEM AND ADJUDICATION METHOD
Vietnam's courts are divided into three levels, namely, courts of original jurisdiction,
intermediate courts of appeal at the provincial level, and the Supreme Court. A central
feature of this People's Court system is the collegial adjudication panel of three members,
including two people assessors or lay assessors who, in principle, have the same powers as
the judge. Economic matters specified but not defined in the laws establishing the court
system, are being handled by economic courts that have two professional judges and one
lay assessor for each sitting. In the trial court, judges as well as lay assessors decide both
questions of law and fact. This is a cause of concern for litigants in disputes involving
complex issues of law, such as commercial disputes. Rules of evidence are not applicable to
all types of litigation, but are treated differently in each area of substantive law.
Vietnam's procedures have several features that distinguish them from both the Western
civil code system and the Anglo-American system, including: (1) the role of procurator in
a civil suit; (2) the ability of higher courts to choose at will to adjudicate any lawsuit being
processed by a lower court; and (3) a procedure for retrial by committee of judges, called
directorate adjudication (giam-doc tham), which is somewhat akin to administrative review.
In terms of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court is the district court where most of
civil law suits, including labor disputes, civil contract disputes (except economic contracts),
and tort disputes are adjudicated except when the suit involves a foreign litigant, in which
case the provincial court has jurisdiction. Grounds for appeal of trial court rulings are
usually issues of procedure, and rarely issues of jurisdiction or substantive law. The Supreme
Court may pick up without an intermediate procedure a lawsuit filed for adjudication in a
lower court; in this case, the Supreme Court's decision is final.42
Apart from the regular appeal procedure, both civil procedure and criminal procedure
allow for retrial through directorate adjudication. The retrial is conducted by a panel or
committee of judges (directorate). The grounds for triggering this procedure are basically
the same as for appeals, namely inadequate inquisition 4 (equivalent to discovery under
common law, but by the Procuracy). Action for retrial can be filed within three years fol-
lowing the final judgment. To the extent a final judgment may not be conclusive, as should
42. Civ. P. DECREE-LAW art. 11.
43. See id. at art. 71; CODE CRIM. P. art. 242.
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normally occur under the principle of res judicata, litigants, particularly investors in com-
mercial disputes, will feel legally insecure as a result of this retrial procedure. This particular
procedure bears similarities to administrative review in the American and some other West-
ern legal systems. It is not found in other socialist legal systems. The rationale for the
procedure is probably the government's desire to add another layer of appeal in order to
compensate for any deficiencies in the court system.
E. INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
The independence of judges, the courts, and of the Judiciary Branch in general is a
relative matter in the context of socialist Vietnam where the judiciary is not regarded as
equal to other branches of government. The Constitution does not state the principle of
separation of powers; it requires the People's Courts to safeguard not only the socialist legal
system but also the socialist regime itself (art. 126). The President of the Supreme Court,
as head of the Judiciary Branch, is responsible to the National Assembly. Similarly, the chief
judges of lower courts at provincial and district levels are to report to their corresponding
local People's Councils. The Prime Minister appoints without consent of National Assem-
bly all judges below the rank of the President of the Supreme Court. This process and the
fact that the judges are not appointed for life discourages independence. In real life, private
businesses and ordinary citizens have lost faith in the court system.
F. VIETA's PROCURACY
Vietnam's Procuracy is typical of a socialist legal institution that has no counterpart in
any Western legal system. Comparatively, the Procuracy has power far beyond that of a
U.S. district attorney or French public prosecutor.
According to Article 137 of the Constitution, the People's Procuracy has the power to
supervise the legality of all government acts "to ensure that all government's acts and actions
are legal, to serve as public prosecutor and to ensure that laws are implemented seriously
and uniformly." Unlike the common law, the Procuracy may be active in a civil law suit.
According to Article 28 of the civil procedure decree-law, the procurator may intervene at
any stage of a civil suit on grounds of safeguarding the socialist (state) properties, of looking
after the interests of workers in labor disputes, and of preventing certain unlawful domestic
relations, such as unlawful marriage. In these areas, the procurator can initiate a lawsuit if
no other interested parties seek action. For an investor, the fact that the procurator can get
involved in a civil suit could complicate the litigation process by adding the government a
an additional party, through the procurator. From a different perspective, a Procuracy can
play a useful role in commercial litigation and can contribute to the functioning of the
emerging market economy. But in reality, the Procuracy is more active in prosecuting
criminal cases for which it is better equipped.
The Procurator General, Chairman of the Procuracy, is appointed by and responsible to
the National Assembly. As such, the Procuracy is, in theory, a government branch of the
same standing as the Supreme Court. In practice, the Procurator General is not only the
most powerful jurist in the legal system, but also politically influential in view of his role
as guarantor of socialist rule of law. Because of its broad powers, an activist Procuracy could
threaten party and government control. On the other hand, the Procuracy is also required
by the Constitution to safeguard the socialist regime, which makes its role quite delicate in
critical times.
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In sum, Vietnam's current court system is not independent. It continues to be constrained
by ideology. Because the legal system continues to be unstructured and informal and law
enforcement is weak, domestic investors and the private sector in general often avoid bring-
ing their disputes to courts but prefer to settle them among themselves or with the help of
the district People's Committee, which is regarded as more effective than the court.
G. CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT AND DisptrrE RESOLtJrION
Joint venture disputes often involve contract enforcement; parties in contract litigation
are mostly foreign investors and their local counterparts, which are generally state-owned
enterprises. Anecdotal evidence of breach of contract is an everyday concern among foreign
investors. Foreign investors and their counsel would do well to familiarize themselves with
Vietnam's contract law and resolution of contract disputes as Vietnam's legal system re-
garding these matters is complicated and frequently revised.
Foreign investors may choose to bring an action against their local partners in a local
court instead of through the International Arbitration Commission (IAC). But the IAC is
a better route because of its comparative competence and efficiency. Local counterparts
may bring an action against their foreign partners in a local court, absent other stipulations
in the joint venture agreement.
Vietnam's contract laws cover civil contracts and economic contracts, which are defined
as "a written agreement between parties with the objectives of production, exchange of
goods and service, study/research, application of scientific inventions and techniques, and
other profit-oriented agreements."44 Economic contracts reflect a Marxian concept of eco-
nomic relationships and have long been a legal instrument in socialist Vietnam. Prior to
the 1989 reform, economic contracts were designed mainly for to achieve a division of labor
between state and cooperative entities. Subsequent decrees promulgated during the re-
form-Ordinance on Economic Contracts, September 25, 1989, and Implementation De-
cree, January 16, 1990-expanded the use of economic contracts to the private sector,
including foreign investments in the context of a multi-sectoral economy, an economy that
includes state sector, private sector and foreign investments. Economic contract was the
only type of contract recognized and protected by the law before the general law on civil
contract was introduced as part of the 1996 Civil Code.
41
Vietnam's contract laws are restrictive in terms of capacity to contract. For example, only
legal entities or persons with a registered business can enter in an economic contract (ex-
ceptions are made for some people having no business registration such as scientists, artists
and fishermen). Provisions for enforcement and performance are unclear amd dispute res-
olution methods are uncertain. According to the pre-code laws, contracts must be in writing,
i.e., oral or implicit contracts usually found in other countries' contract laws are not rec-
ognized or enforceable. The Civil Code itself, which codified most of the previous texts on
civil contract, is silent on this aspect leaving the issue presumably for case law to settle.
Exceptions are made for those without business registration, such as scientists, artists and
fishermen.
44. DECREE LAW ON ECONOMIC CoNTRAcTs art. 1 (Sept. 25,1989).
45. Part I of the Civil Code deals with civil obligations and civil contracts while economic contracts are
still governed by the above-mentioned ordinance.
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H. VIETNAM'S ARBITRATION SYSTEM
Prior to the establishment of economic courts in 1994, enforcement and resolution of
disputes over economic contracts were handled by a system of arbitration that includes
district and provincial arbitration offices and a higher level State Arbitration Office headed
by a Chief Arbitrator that serves as the highest court of appeal for contract disputes. The
State Arbitrator also hears cases involving an amount five hundred million Dong (approx-
imately $50,000 (U.S.)) or more and all cases involving foreign parties, regardless of the
amount in controversy. As with economic contracts, Vietnam has a tradition of dispute
resolution by arbitration. The first arbitration body was established in 1955 to enforce
contracts and resolve contracts disputes between state and cooperative organizations. The
arbitrators are appointed by the Executive Branch of the government and work under the
People's Committees (City or District Governments) or Central Government (for state
arbitrators) although their decisions are binding like Court rulings. This type of dispute
resolution authority, which is not independent, might have worked adequately in lieu of a
proper court system in a centrally planned economy, but may not be sufficient in a mixed
economy where contract disputes can arise between more diversified parties, including the
state, the private sector and foreign investors.
The laws that establish jurisdiction of arbitrators over contract disputes do not exclude
the People's Court System from adjudicating contract matters, but both the courts and the
arbitrators have little experience in settlement of commercial disputes. Since July 1994,
economic cases have been gradually transferred to the Economic Courts, which replaced
the arbitrators. The new courts are staffed in part by the former arbitrators. These courts
are intended to function like a circuit court specializing in commercial disputes. But the
courts are in a formative stage, and their competence and efficiency remain to be seen. For
this reason and many others, domestic investors often brought their contractual disputes
to be resolved at the District People's Committee-part of the city government-instead
of going to court or an arbitrator.
I. ARBITRATION ON CASES INVOLVING FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
Foreign investors, particularly those from the West, find Vietnam's adjudication system
unreliable because they are used to a stable, formal legal environment. The government is
aware of this and has created an International Arbitration Commission to handle contractual
disputes involving foreign investors, but it is too soon to tell whether it will be more effective
than the existing court system.
The Commission is headed by a well respected, French-trained lawyer who was a member
of the old Saigon Bar before 1975. In the majority of the decisions rendered since its
inception, the Commission has ruled in favor of foreign investors. Unless specified in the
disputed contract, the Commission has used the rules proposed by the International Cham-
ber of Commerce (ICC) and the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States, along with other specialized rules relevant
to the subsectors involved.
VIII. Conclusion
A. TOWARD A BETTER SYSTEM: OPEN POLICY VERSUS ENCLAVE STRATEGY-A GOOD START
IN THE LATE 1980s
Vietnam's Foreign Investments Law introduced in 1989, and amended in 1992 and 1996,
was the first law introduced to open up the economy and initiate the transition to a market
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economy. As a result, a significant amount of FDI has occurred in Vietnam. However,
implementation of FDI projects has been slow as about only thirty percent of the invest-
ments approved have been implemented. FDI projects have been concentrated in oil and
gas, and hotel construction instead of diversified manufacturing. As a result, the effects on
employment generation and transfer of technology from these sectors are not as beneficial
as those that result from manufacturing.
B. THE DECLINE IN THE LATE 1990s
Since 1997, FDI in Vietnam declined substantially, which contributed to the decelerated
overall growth of the economy. For years, foreign investors felt insecure doing business in
communist Vietnam, and problems with the legal framework exacerbated by widespread
corruption have been perceived as the number one impediment to investment. Several of
the early comers have pulled out of Vietnam, tired of waiting for real reform to be intro-
duced, including much-needed legal reform.
C. THE ENCLAVE STRATEGY
Vietnam's current legal framework for direct foreign investments is of the enclave type,
in that a special regime is applied to foreign investments. A physical enclave in the form of
Export Processing Zone (EPZ) has been in place since 1993. However, economic experi-
ences have demonstrated that long-term development depends on both increased domestic
and foreign investments. Ideally, there should be one regime for both FDI and domestic
investors, with no enclaves. Experiences in other countries have indicated that incentive
packages are not as important to foreign investors as a good investment climate.
A good investment climate would emerge with an open policy environment that does
not constrain private sector development in general. Such a policy environment is normally
created by a stable legal framework, a transparent and decontrolled regulatory framework,
relatively liberal labor regulation, easy access to utilities, a good physical trade infrastruc-
ture, and a reasonably favorable living environment. In the case of Vietnam, while living
environment is improved, other factors, particularly the policies and legal framework af-
fecting private sector development based on both FDI and domestic investment, remain to
be perfected.
D. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS
Vietnam's legal framework for foreign investments presents a variety of problems. De-
spite recent changes, Vietnam's approval process for FDI is still unnecessarily complicated;
its regulatory framework also created serious impediments to project implementation by
foreign investors. Following passage of the basic FDI law, a number of new laws were
introduced to facilitate the transformation. Efforts to improve other areas of the legal in-
frastructure, however, are not comparable to law-making. This has resulted in an emerging
legal framework featuring a superstructure made of newly enacted laws not adequately
supported by a solid legal infrastructure. The legal framework has become unpredictable
and unstable. More intensified efforts should be made to improve law enforcement. It would
be a mistake to introduce new laws without parallel efforts to effectively implement them,
for laws only work if they are enforced.
Several problems with substantive law, including the thorny issues of corporate gover-
nance in joint ventures and land-use rights, remained unresolved. Apart from the systemic
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problems caused by the lack of an independent Judiciary and deficient due process, Viet-
nam's court system and adjudication methods will be improved only with better training
for lawyers, including judges and other court personnel, members of the bar and above all,
the teaching staff of law schools, where new curricula and teaching methods have yet to be
established. Extensive training of existing legal professionals is key.
E. PROSPECTS
It is unclear whether the Vietnam's government would be willing to undertake further
reform. But it would be unfortunate if Vietnam's leaders leave unfinished the transition to
a market economy. Despite recent setbacks, Vietnam still has great potential for develop-
ment and prosperity. It has proven to be a country of high growth for a decade and seemed
to be on the way to becoming a new "tiger" in Asia. While the last two years have seen an
economic downturn and recent performance of foreign investments is disappointing, Viet-
nam can still recover and return to a high growth path. Whether Vietnam may return to
the "Trail of the Tiger,"46 or remain only a "wild cat"47 would depend to a large extent upon
whether the government and the communist party leadership are willing to undertake real
reform, particularly the legal reforms that remain incomplete.
46. See James Riedel, In the Trail of the Tigers, published as an appendix to the World Bank/UNDP joint
report VirAsma: POLICIES FOR TRANSITION TO AN OPEN ECONOMY. The paper reflected an optimistic view of
Vietnam in the late 1980s.
47. See Pham Van Thuyet, Vietnam: A Tiger or Wild Cat (Nov. 1997) (unpublished paper presented at
Columbia University). The paper discusses Vietnam's economic downturn for the past two years and prospects
for the future.
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